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 2
Women on Corporate Boards: A Comparative Institutional Analysis 
Female corporate board directors remain a minority in the vast majority of boardrooms of 
publicly listed companies the world over (Branson, 2012). The relative absence of women 
corporate board directors has been the subject of extensive research designed to establish the 
business case for women corporate board directors (Nielsen & Hagen, 2009; Bear, Rahman & 
Post, 2010; Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Nielsen & Huse, 2010), and to begin to unravel the 
circumstances and characteristics that facilitate or impede qualified women’s access to 
corporate board directorships (Singh & Vinncombe, 2004; Burke & Mattis, 2000; Sheridan & 
Milgate, 2005, Sheridan, 2001; Burke, 2003; Grosvold & Brammer, 2011, Terjesen & Singh, 
2008). The business case for increased female corporate board participation rests on the 
premise that women directors have been shown to enhance firm financial performance 
(Hillman, Harris, Cannella & Bellinger, 1998; Catalyst, 2007; Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader, 
2003; Carter, Simkins & Simpson, 2003; Huse et al., 2009) and firm’s corporate governance 
practices (Adams & Ferrerira, 2009; Thomson et al., 2005). The relative roles of the 
characteristics and circumstances that facilitate women’s rise to the top have been addressed 
with reference to individual (Sheridan & Milgate, 2005; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004), board 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Westphal & Milton, 2000; Westphal & Stern, 2007), firm (Carter et 
al., 2003; Hillman, Shropshire & Cannella, 2007) and industry (Brammer, Millington & 
Pavelin, 2007a; Grosvold, Brammer & Rayton, 2007) characteristics.  
One level of analysis that has received comparatively little scholarly attention is the 
national level. Aside from a few notable exceptions (e.g., Terjesen & Singh, 2008, Grosvold 
& Brammer, 2011, Grosvold et al., 2007), comparative cross-national research designed to 
uncover the national level mechanisms that facilitate or impede women’s progress to 
corporate boards remains scarce. Scholarship evaluating the role of national level constructs 
in shaping corporate board demography has established that gender specific institutions, such 
as the female managerial talent pool, are associated with a greater number of board directors 
(Terjesen & Singh, 2008) and that conceptual frameworks designed to capture national level 
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 3
institutions such as culture (Gupta, Hanges & Dorfman, 2002) are associated with the share of 
women board directors in a given cluster of countries (Grosvold & Brammer, 2011). These 
studies have made contributions to the comparative national level literature on what drives 
female corporate board participation, but these studies have not systematically analyzed the 
role of social and societal institutions such as the nature of educational systems, the role of 
family in women’s lives, nor how religion, the economic labor market structure and the state 
shape the context within which women make their career choices. It is this gap this study 
begins to address.   
In the wake of Norway’s decision to pass legislation requiring corporate boards to 
have a minimum of 40% of each gender represented on the board of publicly listed companies 
(Grosvold et al., 2007), other countries followed suit, such as Spain (Campbell & Minguez-
Verea, 2008). Legislation has however proved controversial with businesses typically 
preferring voluntary initiatives intended to increase the share of board seats held by women. 
The European Union recently dropped their proposal for EU wide legislation designed to 
make the boardrooms of the EU more gender diverse, and Sweden shelved earlier proposals 
for legislation similar to that of Norway (Thomson, Graham & Lloyd, 2005). These rejections 
of legislative interventions to make boardrooms more diverse suggests that a clearer 
understanding of the institutions analyzed in this paper can not only contribute to the debate 
on what types of levers are available at the national level to increase female board 
participation, but it can also help delineate how board demography is impacted by different 
institutions. It therefore seems timely that these institutions are analyzed with respect to 
female corporate board participation by addressing the research question; how do a country’s 
basic institutions enable or hinder women’s rise to the top of publicly listed companies? The 
research question is addressed with reference to five fundamental institutions common to 
every society (Reus-Smit, 1997): the family, education, economy, religion and government.  
 This study is framed in institutional theory, and in particular in Meyer’s (2010) 
discussion of new institutionalism, which suggests that institutional contexts shape people’s 
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 4
actions and decisions. This context includes national level institutions as embodied in the 
prevailing political, economic, religious and cultural constructs of a given society (Meyer, 
2010). Institutional theory, therefore, sees the choices and behaviors of individual actors as 
being defined and constrained by the particular constellation of institutional characteristics 
that make up their immediate context.  Thus, the focus herein is on the parameters set by the 
national institutional context for women’s executive career ambitions, rather than what 
compels firms to appoint women corporate board directors.  The study thus focuses on the 
supply side and addresses this focus through studying national level institutions. This study 
argues that a country’s institutional context plays an important role in influencing the extent 
of female corporate board participation by affecting the challenges, and constraints faced by 
women as they build their careers.  
This study makes three important contributions. First, the paper systematically 
evaluates the role played by national institutions in shaping corporate board demography of 
publicly listed companies and thus begins to highlight which national institutions can 
facilitate women’s rise to the board. Secondly, it responds to calls for more research into the 
relationships between macro level constructs and micro level practices in the context of 
corporate boards. In particular it responds to the call made by Terjesen and Singh (2008) for 
longitudinal cross-national research that extends the set of institutions they addressed to 
encompass broader institutional contexts in order to understand women’s corporate board 
participation of publicly listed companies in a cross-national perspective. The paper also 
address Grosvold and Brammer’s (2011) call for research that explores the direct relationship 
between defined, ‘unbundled’ institutions and women on the board. The analysis herein 
therefore moves away from firm or board level explanations for the persistent absence of 
female corporate board directors (Hillman et al., 2007, Erhardt et al., 2003; Terjesen & Singh, 
2009; Grosvold & Brammer, 2011) to focus on the role of national level institutions as 
conduits for corporate board demography. Thirdly, this study makes a theoretical contribution 
and proposes an extended view of Meyer’s (2010) institutional decoupling. 
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 5
Literature review 
Scholarly attention paid to the presence or absence of women board directors has increased 
over the last decade: Terjsen et al. (2009) and Davidson and Burke (2012) offer excellent 
reviews of the peer-reviewed literature published to date. The central themes of the debate 
have centered on why women are, in general, absent from the corporate board room (e.g., 
Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004; Thomson et al., 2005; Hillman et al., 2007), what can be done to 
remedy the situation (Singh, Vinnicombe & Terjesen, 2007) and what the nature of these 
remedies should be (Bilimoria & Piderit, 2007; Thompson et al., 2005). Particularly 
controversial has been the decision by certain governments to legislate in favor of increased 
board participation (Grosvold et al., 2007). Opponents have argued that such interventions 
detract from shareholders’ rights to appoint the individuals they would like to see as 
custodians of the firm (Grosvold et al., 2007), and that there is an absence of qualified female 
candidates (Broome, 2007). Proponents, on the other hand, argue that structural interventions 
of this kind are necessary since qualified women candidates are available who continue to 
meet obstacles in their paths to the boardroom (Mattis, 2000).  
Much research concerned with corporate board gender heterogeneity to date has 
focused on the performance imperative as a justification for an increased concern with, and 
interest in women corporate board directors. The empirical results of gender heterogeneous 
boards is mixed. Some studies have shown that women corporate board directors contribute to 
better governance and firm performance (Coffey & Wang, 1998; Williams 2003; Webb 2004; 
Adler, 2001). Women require more robust discussions and thorough analysis before agreeing 
to corporate proposals (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004; Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003), leading 
Thomson et al., (2005) to argue that gender diverse boards are less inclined to rubber stamp 
the CEO’s decisions, and that the presence of women can “...limit the power of male 
‘groupthink’ to nod through ostensibly value-creating proposals or policies that are ethically 
questionable” (Thomsen et al., 2005, p. 18). The inclusion of female board directors has also 
proved financially beneficial, resulting in increased shareholder returns, and higher returns on 
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 6
equity (Hillman et al., 1998; Catalyst, 2007; Erhardt et al., 2003; Carter et al., 2003). Other 
studies have highlighted that gender diverse boards can result in increased conflict and 
delayed decision making (Erhardt et al., 2003; Knight, Pearce, Smith, Olian, Sims, Smith & 
Flood, 1999). With a more diverse range of views and opinions, consensus may also be harder 
to achieve, which in turn may delay decision-making and devolve personal responsibility 
(Erhardt et al., 2003; Knight et al., 1999), leading to lower performance. On balance, the 
argument suggests that board diversity adds more to a company than it takes away (Daily, 
Certo & Dalton, 1999); and increases rather than decreases the board’s independence. Selby 
(2000, p. 239) makes this point when noting that, “directors with diverse skills, experiences 
and backgrounds are more likely to raise questions that add to, rather than simply echo, the 
voice of management”.  
 A less commonly adopted, yet equally important, motivation for analyzing the 
imperative of women corporate board directors, is that qualified women board candidates 
have the same inherent right to accessing board seats as men (Grosvold, Brammer and 
Rayton, 2007). Until women and men have the same access to and opportunities for corporate 
board directorships, gender parity will not prevail, and firms will continue to miss out on the 
skills, insights and contributions women bring (Holton, 2000). Whilst women are now better 
represented across the labor force in general, some argue that the tendency towards only 
justifying commitment to gender equality in the board room on the premise of firm 
performance undermines the basic tenet of equality, which seeks to offer the same 
opportunities for women as men (Conroy, 2000).  
Scholarship has only relatively recently begun to address the contextual impediments 
to and facilitators of female board participation (Davidson & Burke, 2011), and as a result 
comparatively little is known about the circumstances and drivers which encourage female 
board participation. In a review of the available research on female corporate board 
participation, Terjesen et al. (2008) identified a number of individual; firm and industry 
characteristics that encourage women to take up board positions (Terjesen et al., 2008).  
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 7
At the industry level, particular industries have been identified as seemingly 
attracting more female board directors than other industries. For example, Brammer, 
Millington and Pavelin (2007a) studied the prevalence of women on the corporate boards of 
UK companies and found that women occupied a larger share of the board seats in the health 
care, media, banking and utilities sectors. This finding led Brammer et al. (2007a) to conclude 
that proximity to the final consumer was an influential factor in whether women were 
represented on the board in a given industry. Similar findings are also evident in the US 
(Fryxell and Lerner, 1989).  Hillman, Shropshire and Cannella (2007) found that a 1% 
increase in the share of female labor force participation in a given industry was associated 
with approximately 1% increase in the chance that a board had at least one female board 
director. Research has thus successfully established that there is a relationship between a 
firm’s industry and the share of board seats women hold across the sectors’ companies, and 
that female board participation in any given industry differs on a country-by-country basis.   
 Research at the firm level has similarly established a relationship between an 
increased presence of female corporate directors and particular firm characteristics. For 
instance, company size has been associated with mor  gender diverse boards across a range of 
countries including Canada, the UK and the US (Burke & Mattis, 2000, Grosvold et al., 2007; 
Peterson & Philpot, 2007; Terjesen & Singh, 2008). Firms with a stronger financial 
performance record have also been found to have more women board directors (Farrell & 
Hersch, 2005; Catalyst, 2007). What is not clear however is the degree to which women opt to 
serve on better performing corporate boards, or whether boards do better as a result of 
women’s participation (Farrell & Hersch, 2005).  
 At the individual level, researchers have focused on identifying the formal 
educational attainment and experiential characteristics women need to ascend the board. 
Burke (1997), Sheridan (2001) and Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) surveyed female board 
directors in Canada, Australia and the UK respectively, and higher education attainment in the 
form of university degrees was prevalent amongst the female directors in all three countries as 
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 8
well as extensive business experience. Previous CEO experience is seen as a key requirement 
for board appointments (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004; Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2004). 
Zelechowski and Bilimoria (2004) researched female executive directors and found that 
boards were not willing to give women the same influence as their male counterparts, and that 
women were less likely than their male colleagues to be considered for CEO appointments. 
Bilimoria and Piderit (1994) concluded that even when women possessed the relevant skills 
and credentials, women “...continue to be blocked in their rise to the top” (Bilimoria & 
Piderit, 1994, p. 1471).  
 Compared with the research concerned with industry, firm and individual level 
drivers of women’s ascension to the board, a relatively small, but growing body of research 
has begun to address systematically the role of national level drivers in shaping corporate 
board demography. An important stream of research has highlighted the large and persistent 
cross-national variation in the share of board seats that women hold. Studies from the UK, the 
US and Canada show that in 2001 women held 12.4% of board directorships on Fortune 500 
companies in the US (Catalyst, 2001), 6.43% of board directorships in the UK (Singh & 
Vinnicombe, 2001), and 9.8% of the directorships of the Canada Post’s top 500 companies 
(Catalyst, 2001a). By 2010, women held 15.7% of US board seats (Catalyst, 2011), 12.5% of 
UK board seats (Vinnicombe, Sealy, Jacey & Doldor, 2010) and 17.7% in Canada (Catalyst, 
2011a). Similarly descriptive studies of other countries have shown that women are less 
represented than men in corporate boardrooms, with 3.2% female Spanish board directors 
(Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008), and boards in Switzerland have only 0.31% women 
board directors (Ruigrok, Peck & Tacheva, 2007), 0.2% in Japan and 22% in Slovenia 
(Terjesen & Singh, 2008).  
Despite this sustained and wide spread variation in women’s share of board seats, 
only a handful of studies have sought to understand what explains these different participation 
rates. Terjesen and Singh (2008) in their study covering 43 countries explore the role of 
national context for the prevalence of female board directors. They establish that in countries 
Page 8 of 56
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bas
Business & Society
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 
 9
where women occupy a larger share of managerial positions and where the pay gap between 
men and women is less, women are also better represented on the corporate board of 
directors. Grosvold and Brammer (2011) in their study of 38 countries extend the analysis of 
national context and women on the board; however their focus is on determining the 
explanatory power of five commonly adopted institutional frameworks in the context of 
women corporate board directors. They explore whether the proposed conceptual frameworks 
of Whitley (1992, 1999), Hall and Soskice (2001), Gupta et al. (2002), La Porta et al. (1998) 
and Weimar and Pape (1999) offer useful empirical views on female board participation. 
These five institutional systems categorize countries into clusters, depending on their cultural 
(Gupta et al., 2002), legal (La Porta et al., 1998), corporate governance (Weimar & Pape, 
1999) and economic (Whitley, 1992, 1999; Hall & Soskice, 2001) systems. Grosvold and 
Brammer (2011) find that some of the conceptual frameworks have explanatory power, and in 
particular that national culture and legal systems are important constructs in understanding 
female corporate board participation. The authors conclude that as much as half of the 
observed cross-national variation in share of board seats women hold can be attributed to the 
national institutional factors. Grosvold and Brammer (2011), however, recognize that the 
nature of their analysis fails to identify which levers and drivers of women’s career 
progression are most effective in encouraging increased female corporate board participation, 
and that future research should seek to go beyond “national institutional systems (…), and 
explore the underlying components of the broad clusters of institutions” (Grosvold & 
Brammer, 2011, p. 132). The research presented in this paper addresses this void. By studying 
a set of salient national institutional structures that have the capacity to influence women’s 
career progressions and aspirations this study seeks to address the “underlying components” 
of wider institutional systems, and through this research to identify some of the national 
initiatives and policies that have the capacity to increase the share of women corporate board 
directors. 
Conceptual development 
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 10
Central to both the theoretical and empirical scholarship concerned with understanding the 
role and relevance of institutions is the emphasis on the significance of long-lasting, 
embedded, and persistent aspects of a social environment, which in turn have profound effects 
on individuals’ behavior (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), or specifically in our case; on 
women’s career progression. Given this view, the identification of relevant institutions and 
how these institutions impact on the prevalence of women board directors is central to the 
context and issues under study.  
Comparative institutional analysis has played an important role in research concerned 
with a variety of gender-related issues such as female participation in the occupational system 
(Stadelmann-Steffen, 2008), male-female wage differentials (Mandel & Shalev, 2009), and 
female involvement in legislative and political systems (Childs, 2004; Kenworthy & Malami, 
1999). Comparative institutional analysis therefore offers particular value in such contexts 
because of the recognition that many gender issues should be seen as deeply embedded 
historical phenomena that are reflected in many structural and cultural artefacts of modern 
societies (Mackay, 2004).  
Our decision to draw on a range of institutional structures stems both from the 
recognition of the contextual dependence of many gender related issues; but also from the 
observation that the professional emancipation of women who seek to further their careers is 
in part influenced by the social context and institutional structures within which they find 
themselves (Lawrence et al., 2011).  Orloff (1993) commented that, given women’s roles not 
just as professionals, but as central carers and parents, women remain more likely to make 
different career and educational decisions compared with men. Research therefore should 
seek to understand how these basic institutions that make up that society contribute to these 
different decisions.  Our analysis is specifically focused on the character of a country’s five 
basic institutions: the family, government, economy, education system, and prevalence of 
religion. These institutions were chosen because they reflect those institutions that 
comparative institutional analysis suggests all societies exhibit (Reus-Smit, 1997), thus 
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 11
affording the opportunity to make meaningful cross-national comparison around a set of 
defined institutions. Additionally, these institutions have also been highlighted in comparative 
institutional research as central to understanding gender issues (Sjöberg, 2004; Orloff, 1993; 
Martin, 2004). The subsequent sections substantiate these arguments and develop the 
hypotheses that are tested in this paper 
Education 
From an institutional perspective, two salient characteristics make education, and 
higher education in particular, an influential institution both in a generic national sense but 
also specifically for the prevalence of women on corporate boards. Educational institutions 
are an important manifestation of national character, values and norms as education “more 
than any other institution both shapes a nation’s belief about “how things ought to be done” 
and transmits those beliefs and practices to successive generations” (Calori, Lubatkin, Very & 
Veiga, 1997, p. 681). Advanced educational attainment has also been found to be an 
important driver of female professional success and eventual board appointments. Burke 
(1997), Sheridan (2001) and Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) surveyed female board directors 
in Canada, Australia and the UK respectively, and higher education attainment in the form of 
university degrees was prevalent amongst the female directors in all three countries as well as 
extensive business experience. Given the role of education in disseminating and instilling 
national normative patterns of behavior and opinions (Calori et al., 1997) and the necessity of 
higher education qualifications for women who wish to pursue executive careers, where 
women attend university, men are more likely to view women as equals and consider them 
similarly well suited to professional office later on in life (Kanter, 1976). 
 The second respect in which education is a key institution in the context of board 
demography is the network ties that college attendance can bring and which have been found 
to create “an upper class courting environment” (Baltzell, 1964, p. 350) which often ‘funnels’ 
students into the nations’ corporate elite (Westphal & Stern, 2006) Research further finds that 
university ties and social capital in the form of networks drawn from alumni connections ease 
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 12
the path to the boardroom for men (Westphal & Milton, 2000). Sheridan and Milgate (2003) 
also found that senior women highlighted the need for a similar network to acquire corporate 
board directorships in addition to university level educational qualifications. This evidence 
suggests that women who wish to pursue executive careers stand to benefit from both 
acquiring the necessary qualifications for board directorships as well as the requisite network 
by attending university, and simultaneously help foster normative views amongst college 
educated men that women belong in the professional sphere as peers and colleagues thus;  
Hypothesis 1: There is a larger proportion of women on the board in countries with higher 
female participation rates in tertiary education, given the level of participation in tertiary 
education by men.  
 
 
Government & the Economy 
In the context of women corporate board directors, one of the primary implications of 
a society’s economic and government institutions are the incentives and constraints placed 
upon women in respect of their access to labor markets and their ability to progress to more 
senior positions where they acquire the necessary skills and competencies for board 
directorships. Economic and government institutions are therefore important for how they 
inform our understanding of women’s employment patterns and skill investment, and whether 
these institutions enable women to accumulate the necessary professional experience required 
for board appointments.  In particular, if companies are to hire female corporate board 
directors, a necessary prerequisite is a sizable pool of credible female candidates eligible for 
board nomination. However, before women can be considered for board positions, they will 
need to acquire the necessary work experience whilst often also raising a family (Singh & 
Vinnicombe, 2004). Although a conceptual distinction can be made between the government 
institution and that of the economy, female employment opportunities are meaningfully 
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influenced by the government, which in turn influence women’s career trajectories in the 
labor market and their role in the economy at large. Conceptually the role of the government 
is outlined first, before that of the economy.   
Government 
By prioritizing particular legislative programs, a government can signal its 
ideological commitment to particular labor market outcomes, such as women’s career choices 
(Kahn, 2012; Steinmetz, 2012). From a gendered perspective, laws that are designed to 
safeguard women’s autonomy and laws that ensure women’s access to welfare provisions 
designed to enable women to balance work and family commitments better, are examples of 
governmental legislative and ideological priorities that shape women’s professional careers. 
The emphasis here is on the normative intent and ideological commitment to equality that 
underpins such interventions. National governments play a key role in creating the 
institutional infrastructure that allows women to pursue professional careers - and eventual 
board appointments - whilst acting as primary carers in the home (Houseknecht & Sastry, 
1996).  
A related consideration in this regard is whether governments’ policies and legislative 
programs are translated into substantive choices for women. A policy that is not legislated for 
or financially supported may signal an important ideological commitment, but may not have 
the necessary momentum to achieve the policy’s normative intent. A second and important 
consideration is thus whether governments follow up on their policies and translate them into 
economic reality for professional women wishing to build an executive career. This 
discussion suggests that:  
Hypothesis 2: There is a larger proportion of women on the board in countries that have laws 
safeguarding women’s right to a work life balance than in countries that do not afford similar 
legislative safeguards.  
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Hypothesis 3: The proportion of women on the board of directors is positively related to 
investments in initiatives designed to enable women to have a better work-life balance. 
Economy 
The size and structure of the national labor force is a determining factor in whether women 
acquire senior executive positions (Carli & Eagly, 2011). For women to be eligible for 
corporate board directorships they must exhibit similar educational and experiential 
credentials to those of their male colleagues (Sheridan & Milgate, 2005). The elite that makes 
up the nexus of corporate power that is the corporate board of directors is made up of 
individuals with extensive executive experience and managerial skills (Westphal & Milton, 
2000). This requirement for experience necessitates that any efforts to increase female 
representation on corporate boards makes a sustained commitment to career development and 
career advancement by women. Women must have held and succeeded at senior managerial, 
technical, financial or judicial roles to qualify for corporate board positions. Where countries 
adopt legislative programs designed to ease women’s way back into the labor force following 
child birth the pool of female managerial talent qualified for corporate board directorships 
increases (Thompson et al., 2005). This increase in the female talent pool follows as women 
who benefit from the welfare provisions discussed above have been found to be less likely to 
leave full time employment (Jaumotte, 2005; Klerman & Leibowitz, 1993; Ruhm, 1998), 
more likely to gain the necessary skills and experience for higher managerial roles (Standing, 
1999) and are therefore better able to build the requisite contact network necessary to acquire 
corporate board directorships. This discussion suggests that:  
Hypothesis 4: There is a larger proportion of women on the board in countries where women 
make up a larger share of the national labor force than in countries where women represent a 
smaller share of the national labor force.  
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Hypothesis 5: There is a larger proportion of women on the board in countries where women 
make up a larger share of the female managerial talent pool than in countries where women 
represent a smaller share of the female managerial talent pool.  
Family 
Recent research has come to recognize the family institution as a “corporate stakeholder” 
(O’Connor, 2005, p. 1197), and highlighted the influence that domestic relationships and 
arrangements have on women’s corporate careers. In particular, the nuclear family structure 
has been held to represent an important influence on women’s labor force attachment (Budig, 
Misra, & Boeckman, 2012), where married women’s roles as main carers of family and the 
home in particular have been identified as impacting on women’s career prospects and 
earnings (Budig, Misra & Boeckman, 2012). The role and salience of the nuclear family has 
been subjected to change over the lasts four decades, and increasingly research has shown that 
alternate family structures are common amongst women with executive ambitions, as analysis 
of women corporate executives have found that the women who do ascend the corporate 
ladder are more likely to be unmarried (Burgess & Tharenou, 2002).  Research has also found 
that that woman’s increasing career aspirations, commitment to their own career and 
executive aspirations are associated with increasing rates of divorce and monoparental 
families (Mathur-Helm, 2006; Sander, 1985). Some estimates suggest 50% of marriages now 
end in divorce, compared with 10% 50 years ago (OECD, 2010; White, 1990), marking a 
change in the salience of the nuclear family as an institutional structure in women’s lives. The 
relationship between female professional emancipation and divorce is an ambiguous one. 
Whilst some research has attributed increased female career aspirations with increasing rates 
of divorce, others have argued that the increase in divorce rates are forcing women to remain 
active in the labor force since there is approximately a 50% chance that they will have to 
provide for themselves again in the event of the breakup of their marriages (White, 1990). 
This uncertainty creates an incentive to stay active in the labor force and continue to develop 
their professional capital (White, 1990), despite the ‘mother hood penalty’ (Budig et al., 
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2012), so called because even when controlling for differences in professional experience, 
formal education, tenure, and other variables, working mother still earn less. Whichever line 
of argument is taken, it suggests that from a corporate board perspective, a positive 
unintended consequence of the rise in and social acceptance of divorce and the increase in 
monoparental family units is a marked increase the degrees to which women actively develop 
senior professional careers outside the home (Uunk, 2004). Thus, reflecting these changes in 
the structure, nature and character of the family institution it is posited that: 
Hypothesis 6: There is a larger proportion of women on the board in countries where the 
nuclear family structure is less prevalent than in countries where the nuclear family structure 
is the norm.  
 
Religion 
Religion has been identified as an important institution in shaping women’s career (Chadwick 
& Garrett, 1995; Clark & Dawson, 1996). Research has found that religion has been 
associated with the reinforcement of traditional gender patterns, which sees women’s role as 
centering on domestic rather than professional responsibilities. The reinforcement of gender-
based roles has been identified across all the main religions (Lindsey & Silk, 2005), but also 
specifically related to Catholicism and the Protestant belief (Mayer & Smith, 1985; Sjöberg, 
2004), as well as Islam (Brammer et al., 2007b), Buddhism and Hinduism (Lindsey & Silk, 
2005; Ludwig, 2001), though variation in the interpretation of women’s role in society does 
exist across the religious spectrum. For example, Brammer, Williams & Zinkin (2007b) 
concluded in their study of the role of religion in shaping outcomes, including gender quality, 
that “Muslims are supportive of holding companies responsible (…), but do not in general 
expect companies to uphold equal rights between genders. [In Islam] genders are given equal 
value, but different rights” (Brammer et al., 2007b, p. 240). The Catholic faith has also been 
identified as unlikely to be supportive of professional gender equality, with Sjöberg (2004) 
noting that any Catholic based government that sought to address gender equality in the labor 
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market stood to lose popularity. The Protestant faith by comparison has historically viewed 
men and women’s joint labor as central to the faith, but the tenets of the faith have also 
emphasized the central role of women as good wives, mothers and homemakers (Sjöberg, 
2004). The rise of capitalism and the market economy has, however substantively changed 
women’s professional role from a Protestant perspective. Whereas previously women and 
men’s joint labor had been central to married life, the rise of capitalism mean that men’s role 
was focused more in terms of making money, and women’s that of home maker. “With the 
rise of capitalism the Protestants’ image of women took on a new form, which they would 
have found scarcely recognisable” (Hamilton, 2013, p. 98).  
 Religion is also an important factor for women’s career paths through its defining role 
in national value systems (Hargrove, Schmidt & Davaney, 1985, Verweij, Esther & Nauta, 
1997). As such, religious beliefs are still a pervasive force in shaping perceptions of gender 
and often define what is perceived to be right, wrong and acceptable behavior for a given 
society (Parboteeah, Hoegl & Cullen, 2008). In this research, our concern is with the degree 
to which religion may influence women’s access to the corporate boardroom. All the major 
world religions define the role of women in society and delineate the parameters of work and 
economic activity (Parboteeah, Hoegl & Cullen, 2009). Despite the provision within the 
major world religions for women to take up paid employment outside the realm of the home, 
research suggests that countries where a larger proportion of the population classifies 
themselves as religious have a lower proportion of women in their workforce and in 
leadership and executive positions (Lehrer, 1995), as women’s roles is more often defined 
with references to the home  rather than the workplace (Chadwick & Garrett, 1995; Clark & 
Dawson, 1996), with some religious women taking the view that they cannot reconcile a 
professional career with a family without going against the teachings of their faith (Manning, 
1999). The institutional logic offered by religion will thus impact on whether women are able 
to accumulate the requisite work experience necessary to qualify for board room service:  
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Hypothesis 7: There is a larger proportion of women on the board in countries where a greater 
proportion of the population is non-religious than in countries where a greater proportion of 
the population is religious.  
Figure 1 depicts our conceptual model 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Methods 
Sample 
The sample used in this paper was constructed from a dataset obtained from BoardEx, 
a commercially available database that tracks board related information on publicly listed 
companies for a large set of countries globally. For the time period under study, BoardEx data 
was available for 46 countries. A set of criteria was defined that a country had to meet in 
order for it to be included in the sample for this study. The country had to have a financial 
reporting requirement that meant firms published annual reports which would allow us to 
verify the board data contained in BoardEx. The country had to operate a governance 
structure that meant the board was the firm’s highest corporate decision-making body, as the 
presence of this structure provided the similarity needed to facilitate comparisons across the 
sample. Thirdly, as the number of publicly listed companies varied greatly on a country-by-
country basis and a number of countries had only one or two firms, it was decided that there 
had to be a minimum of teni firms for which there were observations year-on-year and finally 
the final sample had to represent as geographically and institutionally diverse set of countries 
as possible, to allow for the institutional variation across countries to be analyzed. These 
parameters allowed us to construct a sample of 23 institutionally distinct, yet comparable 
countries. The sample includes observations from Europe, including the former Eastern Bloc, 
European Economic Area countries, Australasia, Japan and the United States. Cumulatively, 
an unbalanced panel dataset of 163 national observations for 23 countries from 2000-2006 
was constructed. Whilst the sample represents an interesting range of countries, the sample is 
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not globally representative as data restrictions meant that the sample did not include any 
countries from the African continent, nor from Latin America, and the sample includes only 
one Asian country. This issue is revisited in the limitations section of the paper. The focus on 
this period of time is driven in part by a desire to remain focused on data after the collapse of 
the ‘dot com’ bubble in 2000 and before the onset of the financial crisis in 2007. In any event, 
the ability to extend the panel much earlier than 2000 is constrained by the availability of data 
(especially on board directorships), and as such the choices involved in the construction of the 
sample reflect a desire to represent as wide a range of countries as possible across the sample 
period. As the number of years for which data was available from each country differed, the 
dataset used was unbalanced. This decision seems appropriate as the use of a balanced dataset 
would necessitate losing seven countries from the analyses and substantially reduce the 
institutional variety in the panel. This effect could be partially mitigated by shortening the 
length of the panel, but this mitigation would have only a marginal effect on the number of 
countries with complete data while substantially shortening the longitudinal dimension of the 
panel. ii  Following earlier research on women corporate board directors, our dependent 
variable is the percentage of corporate board seats filled by women in a given country-year 
and is calculated according to methods similar to those followed by Terjesen and Singh 
(2008) and Arfken, Bellar and Helms (2004). For each corporation the number of board seats 
available was identified, and then a count was made of how many of the available seats were 
occupied by women in each year. The data was then aggregated to the national level by 
calculating how many board seats the largest publicly listed companies had between them in 
total, and then how many of these seats were held by women. The total number of board seats 
women held was then divided by the total number of available board seats. This gave a 
percentage share of board seats held by women for a given country in a given year.  
For analytical reasons of consistency, it was necessary that there be a meaningful way 
of comparing corporations across countries, and publicly listed companies fulfill key criteria 
in this regard. Publicly listed companies are generally obliged to submit annual reports which 
not only detail their financial performance, but also the composition of their corporate board. 
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Importantly, this information is also publicly available. A related, but equally important, point 
is that for the purpose of comparison the unit of analysis needs to be the same. All publicly 
listed firms in the countries included in our analysis had a corporate board of directors that 
represented the highest decision making body of the firm. To fulfill these criteria it was 
necessary to select publicly listed firms. This restriction meant that alternate corporate forms 
such as e.g. privately owned firms, family companies and cooperatives or small 
entrepreneurial companies could not be investigated, as data was not available across the 
sample countries.  
Data was aggregated from the firm to the country level using board data from 
company annual reports as compiled by BoardEx, a commercially available database of the 
largest listed companies in a wide range of countries, which has been used in earlier academic 
research (Singh, 2007). To ensure that this method produced estimates of female board 
participation in line with previous published studies BoardEx’s data was triangulated with 
other sources including the European Commission, Spencer Stuart Board Indices, Catalyst, 
and the Australian Equal Opportunities for Women in the Workplace Agency (EOWA). 
Where comparison was possible, these sources provided similar estimates of female board 
participation, and as such BoardEx data was used throughout to maximize the breadth of 
countries available for analysis with data collected from a single source. 
The number of companies listed on particular stock exchanges varies considerably 
across countries – for example, the New York Stock Exchange currently has over 8,000 listed 
companies, whereas Finland’s Helsinki Stock Exchange lists only 130 companies.   Our 
approach to dealing with this issue was threefold. First, firms were typically picked based on 
membership of the set of largest listed stocks in each country by reference to a locally 
prominent stock index, such as the S&P 500 for the United States, the DAX for Germany, the 
CAC for France etc. This approach reflects the necessary flexibility in defining a 
representative set of companies listed in a given country but does so in a non-arbitrary 
manner. Second, wherever possible every effort was made to triangulate our estimate with 
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 21
estimates available in a range of secondary sources as described. Third, a range of robustness 
tests were run that imposed different thresholds for the number of company observations used 
in the analysis to ensure that our findings were robust to this decision.iii 
Independent variables  
The measurement of female enrollment in tertiary education, given the levels of 
enrollment of men in tertiary education is operationalized as the difference between the 
participation rates of women and men as indicated by tertiary enrollment data from the World 
Bank’s Development Indicators Database. This metric is not a measure of the level of 
education, but a measure of relative access. The data represents the difference between two 
percentages, with positive values suggesting that a greater proportion of women are enrolled 
in tertiary education relative to men (Hypothesis 1). The World Bank Development Indicators 
Database has been used in previous peer reviewed research relating to education (see e.g. 
Shin & Harman, 2009; Yang & McCall, 2013). The use of lagged values of this variable was 
considered, in order to reflect the state of the educational environment at the time today’s 
directors were being educated, but this consideration raised a concern that the loss of 
observations and country coverage would be severe. The correlation between the 
contemporaneous and a 20-year lagged measure is high (0.77), suggesting that the 
contemporaneous values serve as a useful proxy for the lagged measures, thus allowing us to 
preserve the largest and broadest sample possible for use in this paper, but for completeness a 
regression based on the lagged values is reported as Model 7 in Table 3. 
To measure national commitment to safeguarding women’s right to return to work 
(Hypothesis 2) a binary variable equaling one where women have the right to return to their 
previous role or zero otherwise was used. To determine which countries afforded women the 
right to return to their previous role, the Women Business and the Law report published by 
the World Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 2009 was 
used. To measure national investment in work-life initiatives designed to enable working 
parents to raise a family whilst being active in the workforce data was collected that looked at 
Page 21 of 56
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bas
Business & Society
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 
 22
the generosity of state funding for childcare (Hypothesis 3). These data come from the OECD 
Social Expenditure Database. Childcare funding was measured as the per capita number of 
US dollars per head invested in subsidized childcare. These measures were chosen as they 
represented direct interventions likely to impact women’s careers.  This measure from OECD 
Social Expenditure Database has also been used by e.g. Kalwij (2010), Goerres and Tepe 
(2010) and Noailly and Visser (2009).  
To measure the prevalence of women in the workforce and managerial positions the 
percentage of women between the ages of 25-54 active in the workforce and the percentage of 
women employed in legislative and managerial occupations from the International Labor 
Organization’s LABORSTA database (Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5) was extracted. Given 
the very small number of legislative positions relative to managerial roles in the private 
sector, this percentage is dominated by the extent to which women acquire managerial 
positions in commercial organisations. The International Labor Organization is a tripartite 
United Nations Agency and the data it produces has been used in related research on women 
corporate board directors (e.g. Terjesen & Singh, 2008).  
In recognition of the changing structure of the family institution and in particular the 
decline in the nuclear family that may have had the unintended consequence of increasing 
women’s professional capital investment, divorce was measured as a proxy for the changing 
face of family structures (Hypothesis 6). Divorce rates were calculated as the number of 
divorces granted in a given year as a percentage of the number of marriages entered into in 
the same year. The number of marriages and the number of divorces were both collected from 
the United Nations (UN) Demographic Year Book (2004 and 2007 editions). This measure 
was used as it best reflects the prevalence of divorce in a given country and therefore also 
provides a useful indicator of the acceptability of divorce in a given country. The measure has 
been previously adopted in research: see for example Ruppanner (2012) and Neugart, (2012) 
The institution of religion was quantified by obtaining the percentage of the 
population in each country who characterized themselves as religious using data from the 
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Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) (Hypothesis 7). The ARDA database of 
religious beliefs draws in the main on the 2003 US State Department’s International Religious 
Freedom Reports, but is also augmented by further data from such institutions as the United 
Nations to create a more complete and reliable dataset. The data collected is based on the 
question: “Do you consider yourself as belonging to a particular religion”. The data collected 
by ARDA has been used in previous research (e.g. Karakitapoğlu, Mahmut and Salih, 2008).  
Empirical approach 
Empirically, the objective is to test the specific relationship between the share of board seats 
women hold and the individual institutions included for analysis before presenting a model 
that encapsulates the entire set of institutions. This approach is adopted to provide 
transparency regarding the nature of the individual relationships before presenting the final, 
collective model on which we base the tests of our hypotheses. 
The analysis is carried out using a random effects model. This empirical approach 
was the most appropriate given the size and nature of the sample. In common with other 
comparative research relating to boards of directors (Terjesen & Singh, 2008; Jackson, 2004), 
the unit of analysis (the country) results in a relatively small sample size when compared to 
firm-level research. Our use of panel data raises the possibility that the multiple observations 
taken from any single country may not be independent, thus violating the assumptions of an 
ordinary least squares regression model. This issue is particularly relevant in our sample 
because country-level institutions are, by definition, relatively stable and slow to change over 
time (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Scott, 1995). The temporal stability of the institutional features 
of countries also leads us to select a random effects approach to dealing with the non-
independence of observations. Following Gray, Kittilson and Sandholtz, (2006) and Queralt, 
Witte and Griesinger (2000) the appropriateness of this choice was evaluated using the 
Baltagi-Li lagrange multiplier test (Baltagi & Li, 1990), which formally tests the null 
hypothesis that the variance of the intercept component of the error term in a random effects 
model is zero as opposed to the alternative that it is not. Rejection of the null hypothesis of 
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this test, as occurs in all of our regression models, indicates a preference for random effects 
estimators over OLS.  
Findings 
This section presents the findings of our empirical analyses. Table 1 shows the 
percentage share of women board seats held by women in the most recent year for which 
BoardEx data is available for each country in our sample. Consistent with the observations of 
earlier studies undertaken in particular country settings, Table 1 shows that there is 
considerable variation across countries in the proportion of directorships held by female 
directors (Burke, 1999; Singh et al., 2001, 2004). At one end of the spectrum, over 30% of 
directorships are occupied by women in Norway, whilst at the other end of the spectrum; 
female directors are almost entirely absent from boardrooms in Japan.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in our regression sample, 
which provides a way to evaluate the broad characteristics of our data. These statistics are 
calculated by weighting the information from each country-year equally. The mean 
proportion of directorships held by women is 7.95 percent on this basis. The natural logarithm 
of this variable was used to address the non-normality of the dependent variable. Countries 
for which the reported proportion of women on the board is zero are given values of zero for 
this newly transformed variable.  The average rate of divorce for the sample was 42.84 
percentage points, whilst enrollments in tertiary education are on average 16.01 percentage 
points higher for women than for men. This variable ranges from a high of 44.46 in Iceland to 
-10.96 in Switzerland. Female labor force participation between the ages of 25-55 was on 
average 76.41 percentage points. The proportion of women employed in managerial roles 
ranges from 9 per cent in Japan to 43 per cent in the United States, with a mean of 31.90 per 
cent. State funded daycare provisions had a mean value of $186.31 per head, and 
approximately 86 percent of the population expresses some religious affiliation in our sample.  
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INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Table 2 also presents the bivariate correlations between our regression variables. This 
table includes both the raw and the log-transformed dependent variable for comparison, as 
interpretation of the mean score of the former is transparent and the latter is used in the 
regression analyses. These measures are understandably highly correlated due to their 
arithmetic linkage. Both of these variables are significantly correlated with variables 
supporting the importance of our institutional measures. Indeed, there are significant 
correlations between the natural logarithm of the percentage of board directorships held by 
women with all of our institutional measures. The variance inflation factors reported on the 
main diagonal of Table 2 are all well below the levels typically associated with high levels of 
multicollinearity. 
Table 3 presents the regression analyses. These are separated into seven models in 
order to assess each institution separately, thus ensuring that the correlation between the 
institutional proxies does not drive the results, and each of these are described in turn. The 
first five models produce acceptable model fit statistics that are consistent with the exclusion 
of other meaningful institutional measures, and Model 6 demonstrates the combined power of 
these institutions for understanding the percentage of board seats held by women around the 
world (R-squared of 0.564), and the results of this model are relied on in testing our 
hypotheses. Model 7 replaces the contemporaneous value of the female-male difference in the 
rate of enrollment in tertiary education with a 20 year lag of the same variable to assess the 
robustness of our hypothesis testing. The Baltagi-Li test statistic was used to verify the need 
for an empirical approach that controls for the country-level blocking of the data described in 
the methods section of the paper. The minimum value of our Baltagi-Li test statistic across 
the seven models of Table 3 is 103.10 (in Model 7), which is substantially larger than the 
critical value required to reject the null hypothesis that a pooled cross sectional approach is 
appropriate. This result supports our use of a random effects approach.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
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Model 1 focuses on the possible importance of educational institutions for the 
prevalence of women on corporate boards. The model fits fairly well, with an R-squared of 
0.326. The regression coefficient for this variable is 0.039, and it is significant at the 99 
percent level (t=7.761). This finding suggests that female access to tertiary education may 
contribute to the share of board seats held by women.  
Model 2 examines the possible impact of government on women corporate board 
directors. The model has acceptable fit, with an R-squared of 0.175, and illustrates significant 
links between government spending on daycare (99 percent level) and the legal protection of 
a mother’s right to return to her pre-pregnancy job role (95 percent level).   
Model 3 investigates the labor market position of women. This model fits very well, 
with an R-squared of 0.507. The regression coefficients for the female labor force 
participation rate and the proportion of women employed in managerial roles are both positive 
and are both significant at the 99 percent level.  
Model 4 explores the relationship between family institutions, as proxied by divorce 
rates, and the proportion of directorships held by women. The fit of the model is acceptable, 
with an R-squared of 0.134. The results suggest a significant positive relationship between 
divorce rates and the proportion of board directorships held by women.  
Model 5 examines the impact of religious affiliation on the proportion of board 
directorships held by women. This model fits very poorly, with an R-squared of only 0.023. 
This result is reinforced by the insignificance of the regression coefficient attached to 
religious affiliation in Table 3. While this coefficient is near the 90 percent significance level 
(t=1.539), this lack of significance is a consistent feature throughout the robustness checks 
described earlier regarding our sample selection.  
Having examined each of these categories in separate models the next step is to 
include all of these variables in one regression in order to assess overall model fit and to seek 
support for our hypotheses. Model 6 fits well, with an R-squared of 0.564. The results of the 
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previous models are broadly confirmed. Positive and significant links persist with women 
corporate board directors associated with divorce rates, educational enrollment differentials, 
the proportion of women employed in managerial roles and government spending on daycare, 
albeit with weaker significance levels associated with divorce rates (t=2.528) and the 
proportion of women in managerial roles (t=2.513). While the effect of religious affiliation 
remains insignificant, the insignificance of the effect of female labor force participation rates 
(t=1.485) and the existence of a right to return to work (t=0.478) in Model 6 are notable. 
These hypothesis tests are unaffected by the use of a lagged value of female-male rates of 
enrollment in tertiary education (Model 7).iv 
Discussion and limitations 
This article addressed the research question; how do a country’s basic institutions 
enable or hinder women’s rise to the top of publicly listed companies? The research was 
framed in Meyer’s (2010) phenomenological view of institutional theory. Our research 
question was addressed with reference to five basic institutions that the literature has argued 
are present in all countries (Reus-Smit, 1997), and which based on the literature and theory 
outlined above were deemed likely to be related to women’s prevalence on corporate boards 
of directors. Thus, family structures, tertiary education, religious pervasiveness, state 
interventions and economic structures were explored in relation to the share of board seats 
women hold at national level. As such, this study has begun to unbundle some of the 
parameters of the frameworks evaluated by Grosvold & Brammer (2011). Our descriptive 
findings validate the observations made in numerous previous studies that have examined the 
prevalence of women on boards in particular country settings (Terjesen, Sealy & Singh, 2009; 
Hillman, Shropshire & Cannella, 2007; Grosvold, Brammer & Rayton, 2007; Ruigrok et al., 
2007) that the proportion of directorships held by women varies substantially across 
countries. Our argument in this study is that these differences are strongly associated with 
features of countries’ basic institutions. Broadly, our results provide a high level of support 
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for our hypotheses with some statistically significant associations being identified for four out 
of the five areas of country institutions.  
Our results suggest that the institutions of education and family structures influence 
women’s rates of board participation. Our hypothesis arguing that where women are well 
represented in tertiary education, given the level of male participants, countries had higher 
rates of female board participation was supported. This finding aligns with those of Grosvold 
and Brammer (2011) who found that liberal market economies as defined by Hall and Soskice 
(2001) and that compartmentalized economies as identified by Whitley (1992; 1999) where 
tertiary education were central to professional career progression, had a larger share of female 
board directors.  
Similarly, our findings support our hypothesis that an unintended outcome of the 
higher rates of divorce seen over the decades, has had the effect of increasing women’s labor 
force commitment, their investment in human capital and ultimately their access to corporate 
boards.  Furthermore, our results show that where women constitute a larger share of the 
managerial segment of the labor market they are also more prevalent in the context of 
corporate boards. The economy provides both incentives and constraints on women’s career 
progression. Our findings suggest that where the labor market is structured in such a way that 
women are able to progress to managerial ranks in greater numbers they are also able to 
accumulate the necessary human capital that is required for board directorships. When viewed 
in conjunction with the statistically significant positive link between the availability of 
subsidized childcare and women on the board, these findings suggest that financial 
commitment is arguably a stronger driver for female board participation than legislation 
alone. In light of the fact that in our sample 75 percent of women between the ages of 25-54 
were active in the labor force yet had a mean representation on the board of less than 8 
percent, this finding is interesting. It suggests that governments that substantiate their policy 
commitment with financial supports may be more successful in channeling women into 
executive positions than governments that signal a commitment to women managerial careers 
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through legislation but don’t go as far as making financial investments designed to deliver on 
the signaled commitment. These findings also help add nuance to the findings in Grosvold 
and Brammer (2011) who found that women were more prevalent on the boards of firms in 
countries where the state was bound by common rather than civil law as defined by La Porta 
et al. (1998). Having hypothesized that women board directors were more prevalent in 
countries with civil law protection in the form of greater employment safeguards and welfare 
benefits, Grosvold and Brammer (2011) instead found that women were more prevalent 
across boardrooms of firms operating in common law countries. This finding led Grosvold 
and Brammer to conclude that “women prevail to a larger degree on corporate boards in 
countries where the legal institutional system is based on market forces” (p. 132). 
Cumulatively, these findings add weight to Clegg’s (2010) argument that “some basic 
institutional elements seem to have gone missing in action, notably discussion of power, in 
part…due to the absence of the state” (p. 11). 
 These findings shed new empirical light on what facilitates and impedes the access 
of women to the corporate boardroom. Although the role of the education and family 
institutions have been qualitatively explored in individual country contexts previous research 
(e.g. Davidson & Burke, 2011) our study shows the statistically significant salience of tertiary 
education enrollment for women wishing to access the corporate boardroom across our 
sample countries. Similarly, our finding that the state and economy appear to play a role in 
shaping board demography has to our knowledge, not been systematically ascertained in 
previous-cross national research.  
Conceptually our study makes three distinct contributions. Compared with previous 
literature, which has either focused solely on gender specific institutions (Terjesen & Singh, 
2008) or has analyzed previously defined bundles of institutions (Grosvold & Brammer, 
2011), our research responds to Whetten’s (1989) call for conceptual comprehensiveness 
which encourages the inclusion of all constructs that could logically be considered relevant to 
the phenomenon under study.  Given that the five basic institutions included are those deemed 
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to be the most central and most prevalent across all societies, they were all deemed relevant 
either on the basis of previous empirical research, conceptual development or answered direct 
calls from earlier research to understand better the nuanced institutional ‘macro worlds’ that 
women face (Terjsen & Singh, 2008; Grosvold & Brammer, 2011), so our construct decisions 
were parsimonious. In light of our empirical results, this theoretical framing sheds new light 
on the nature and relationship between institutions. In particular, our findings suggest that the 
relationship between the market and the state may not be as diametrically opposed as previous 
institutional research has suggested (Zald & Lounsbury, 2010). The finding that the provision 
of state subsidized childcare was associated with a greater share of women board directors 
and that where the economic labor market structures were such that they enabled women to 
rise up to the managerial ranks boards were demographically more diverse suggests that the 
state helps enable growth of the female managerial talent pool. Firms should therefore not 
necessarily deem state intervention as an obstruction since the evidence points to a more 
diverse talent pool as a result. Secondly, our results also seem to question Meyer’s (2010) 
observation that institutional decoupling between policy and practice means political intent is 
seldom realized through policy. Meyer (2010) points to previous research which has shown a 
discrepancy between policy and practice, and argues that nation states frequently seek to 
retain international legitimacy by passing legislation and making investments in areas that are 
high on the political agenda in other countries.  He argues that social change will often 
happen irrespective of policy, instead arguing that agency, the purposeful, directed and 
autonomous behavior of the individual, causes national institutional change, irrespective of 
state intervention. Our results question the veracity of this conceptual premise. Countries that 
invest more in state funded childcare have more women on the board, pointing to the 
importance of policy backed up by investment. If Meyer’s (2010) postulation was correct the 
expectation would be that the effect of state intervention would be smaller. Instead, there was 
little evidence of an ‘agentic’ effect. On average more than 75% of women were active in the 
labor force across our sample and constituted nearly 32% of the managerial talent pool, yet 
women had on average less than 8% of board seats. The absence of a significant effect from 
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the legislation safeguarding women’s right to return to work should similarly be accompanied 
by a greater share of board directors, if institutional agency does replace policy.  This finding 
leads the authors to propose a modified view of the role of the state, a view which is aligned 
with Clegg’s (2010) observation that the role of power and the state should not be ignored in 
the debate on basic institutions, and argue that the state, rather than being a peripheral and 
opposing force to the market and economic structure, has the power to play a role in 
facilitating market outcomes that are in the interest of women and business.   
Secondly, our findings that the institutions of education and family are related to 
female executive outcomes points to the importance of social institutions for more gender 
diverse boards, elements which previous research has in the main not explored in relation to 
corporate board participation. An unintended consequence of the increased rate of divorce and 
the rise of monoparental households seen across our sample countries was a higher rate of 
female corporate board participation.  The view by O’Connor (2005) of the corporation as a 
stakeholder in people’s private sphere thus seems accurate, as depending on which line of 
argument is posited, women either divorce to pursue their careers (Mathur-Helm, 2006; 
Sander, 1985) or are forced to have a career as a r sult of divorce (White, 1990). Recently 
however Özcan and Breen (2012) have argued that there is consistent evidence that women 
pursue career advancement in anticipation of divorce. Irrespective of the causal direction, our 
finding reveals that the relationship between the family institution and women’s executive 
careers may be more complex than originally thought. Although the link between women’s 
commitments to child rearing and responsibilities in the home, lower labor force participation, 
lower pay and different career prospects have been well established, the finding that societal 
acceptance of monoparental households is linked to a larger share of women board directors 
does not imply that divorce is an optimal outcome for women. Rather, it recognizes that in 
countries where monoparental families are more common women seem to make different 
career choices in relation to their family and work commitments. Lauer and Yodanis (2010) 
argue that these choices do not represent a rejection of the nuclear family paradigm, rather 
they afford women choices with regards to their circumstances and priorities, which in turn 
Page 31 of 56
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bas
Business & Society
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 
 32
enables them to recognize when their circumstances are compatible with the institution of 
marriage and when other family structures are better suited to their circumstances.  
Thirdly, the importance of tertiary education for female corporate board participation 
also speaks to our conceptual framing. Meyer (2010) points out that the phenomenological 
view of institutional theory sees higher education as key to empowerment and socialization, 
and in particular that access to the right social networks is central to gaining access the 
societal power elites, such as corporate boards. The institution of education has also been 
found to serve as a “receptor site” (Soysal, 2012, p. 48) to entitlements and privileges, where 
students become cognizant of their ability and perceived right to join societal elites and 
consequently through education become; “endowed with enormously expanded competencies 
and powers” (Meyer, 2010, p. 9). However women have seemingly benefitted comparatively 
less in an executive context from these competencies and powers, given that on average 
across our sample countries they were better represented in tertiary education than their male 
counter parts and have been for nearly 20 years (United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 
1991).  
Our findings have implications for practice, both at the firm and country level. At the 
country level, investment in policies that encourage women to return to, and remain in the 
work force following childbirth should be prioritized, as should labor market structures that 
don’t disadvantage women and discourage human capital investment.  This prioritization is 
particularly important in light of our educational result. Since it is not access and participation 
in education per se which is problematic, but the ‘talent leakage’ between graduation and the 
board room, the state should focus its efforts on investments in initiatives that begins to stem 
the talent loss and encourages professional talent development and consolidation. Welfare 
provisions that enable women to balance to their careers and other commitments may work 
well in this regard.  At the firm level, companies can put in place complimentary initiatives 
that allow women the necessary flexibility in managing their home commitments and their 
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professional lives. Supportive working policies may also contribute to taking some of the time 
pressure off working parents, and potentially also contribute to more stable family lives.  
Reflecting on our findings and their implications for the future of women on 
corporate boards of directors, our results may be good news for women. The natures of 
institutions of government and economy are such that they can be changed more quickly than 
other institutions such as the influence of e.g. religion. This difference in speed of adjustment 
arises because legislation and market interventions like changes to employment parameters 
and incentives can be implemented coercively, as was done in Norway. Socially grounded 
institutions (e.g. family structure) cannot generally be changed in this way as they are more 
closely aligned with societal values, norms and taken-for-granted patterns of behavior, which 
by their very nature are slow to change (Deeg, 2007). The relative efficacy of the government 
and economy institutions means that women can see a change in their ability to rise to the 
very top of corporate power, though the efficacy of these institutions is of course dependent 
on a state that has the power and the determination to implement such changes successfully.  
This study has some limitations, several of which could profitably be addressed in 
future research. Firstly, our analysis was concerned with understanding the nature of the 
relationships between specific basic institutions and the share of women on the corporate 
board. These specific relationships were the focus of our study in order that the findings of 
Grosvold and Brammer (2011) could be disaggregated. Whilst the analysis sought to pry the 
five basic institutions apart to understand the relationships between women on the board and 
each individual institution, in reality, the basic institutions operate together to form a societal 
whole. Future research could therefore profitably address this limitation to understand 
potential interactions between institutions better. Other measurement techniques such as 
hierarchical linear modelling could be useful in this regard. Second, our analysis examined 
large publicly listed companies, and did therefore not take account of the difference in 
representation women may enjoy in other corporate forms such as family owned firms, 
entrepreneurial firms and cooperatives. A better understanding of women’s status in the 
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governance context of these types of firms would extend our understanding of the role 
executive women are given in different firm contexts. Thirdly, as our intent was understand 
what drives the share of board seats that are allocated to women at a national level rather than 
what drives the absolute size of the female directorial talent pool, our data did not take 
account of board interlocks. Future scholarship could map the incidence of female board 
interlocks to uncover both the absolute size of the female directorial talent pool and to 
understand how interlocks serve women directors. Whilst our study focused on women’s 
career progression, it did not explore what compels firms to appoint women corporate board 
directors. There is thus an opportunity to assess the demand side of this equation, and explore 
how firm’s institutional context e.g. the salience of corporate governance codes or the passing 
of gender equitable legislation such as that adopted in Norway, impact on firm’s decision to 
foster more gender heterogeneous boards. Furthermore, the sample on which the study is 
based, was not globally representative as it did not include any countries from Africa and 
Latin America, and only one Asian country, due to data limitations from these areas. Our 
results are therefore restricted to the sample countries. Future research should focus on better 
understanding how national institutional contexts play a role in the share of board seats that 
women hold across those countries not included in our study, and seek to understand how the 
particular constellation of national institutions in these countries impact on corporate board 
gender heterogeneity.   
Finally, although the institutional argument put forward in this article has been lent 
credence in our statistical results, inherent in the use of statistical analysis is the absence of a 
constructivist perspective anchored in organizational discourse and broader meaning systems. 
The voice of the women themselves is distinctly absent from this analysis, in particular as 
regards their career ambitions. An interesting future avenue of research could address whether 
women themselves see board directorships as something to covet, and similarly whether the 
status of interest in board directorships is uniformly appraised across countries, or whether it 
has inherently different characteristics and attractions in different national contexts. Indeed, 
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the resource dependence perspective may have a complimentary lens to offer our 
understanding for women corporate board directors.  
Despite these limitations, this study has contributed to furthering our understanding 
of what drives corporate board demography, and highlighted the wide variation in the 
prominence of women on corporate boards across countries. The study also clearly shows that 
governmental institutions and prevailing economic systems are most strongly associated with 
the prevalence of women on companies’ boards of directors.   
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Figure 1 Conceptual model 
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Table 1: The percentage of company directorships held by women by country in 2006.  
These figures are based on data from BoardEx.  
     
Country Percentage   Country Percentage 
Australia 6.92  Japan 0.00 
Austria 5.36  Netherlands 5.52 
Belgium 6.97  New Zealand 8.65 
Czech Republic 11.00  Norway 36.10 
Denmark 10.33  Poland 12.00 
Finland 19.74  Portugal 3.07 
France 8.20  
Republic of 
Ireland 5.69 
Greece 6.94  Spain 7.66 
Hungary 11.00  Sweden 20.78 
Iceland 14.00  Switzerland 6.09 
Italy 5.02  United Kingdom 8.40 
      United States 15.06 
     
Page 45 of 56
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bas
Business & Society
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 
 46
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Summary statistics are based on the regression sample of 163 country-years. Variance inflation factors from Model 6 of Table 3 are included in parentheses on the main diagonal to assess 
potential multicollinearity. Figures relating to the lagged value of Female-Male difference in the rate of enrollment in tertiary education are based on Model 7 of Table 3. 
 
Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) Percentage of board directorships held by women 7.95 5.16 (na)
(2) Natural logarithm of the percentage of board directorships held by women 2.04 0.57 0.90 ** (na)
(3) Divorce rate 42.84 14.48 0.30 ** 0.37 ** (1.85)
(4) Female-Male difference in rate of enrollment in tertiary education 16.01 11.26 0.57 ** 0.60 ** 0.05  (2.37)
(5) Female-Male difference in rate of enrollment in tertiary education (20 year lag) -3.02 5.40 0.58 ** 0.65 ** 0.11  0.77 ** (2.48)
(6) Female labor force partipation rate for women aged 25-55 (%) 76.41 7.00 0.50 ** 0.54 ** 0.53 ** 0.34 ** 0.26 ** (2.77)
(7) Proportion of women employed in executive/managerial roles 31.90 5.76 0.25 ** 0.46 ** 0.17 * 0.43 ** 0.49 ** -0.02  (1.74)
(8) Government spending on daycare in annual US Dollars per head 186.31 132.04 0.43 ** 0.42 ** 0.20 ** 0.45 ** 0.21 ** 0.61 ** -0.10  (2.34)
(9) Existence of a 'right to return' to job after maternity leave (1=Yes) 0.88 0.33 0.25 ** 0.34 ** -0.09  0.59 ** 0.59 ** -0.07  0.45 ** 0.24 ** (2.01)
(10) Percentage of population expressing some religious affiliation 86.47 9.23 0.07  0.17 * -0.30  0.20 ** 0.41 ** -0.08  0.24 ** -0.18  0.20 * (1.35)
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
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Table 3: Influences on the prevalence of women on corporate boards 
Random effects panel regression results. Dependent variable is the percentage of corporate board positions held by women in each country-year. 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female-Male difference in rate of enrollment in tertiary education 0.039 ** 0.020 **
(7.761) (3.471)
Female-Male difference in rate of enrollment in tertiary education (20 year lag) 0.053 **
(5.030)
Government spending on daycare in annual hundreds of US Dollars per head 0.239 ** 0.132 ** 0.147 **
(5.579) (3.023) (3.193)
Existence of a 'right to return' to job after maternity leave (1=Yes) 0.604 * -0.119  -0.203
(2.145) (-0.478) (-0.834)
Female labor force partipation rate for women aged 25-55 (%) 0.049 ** 0.014  0.000
(6.477) (1.485) (-0.003)
Proportion of women employed in executive/managerial roles 0.051 ** 0.032 * 0.030 *
(4.794) (2.513) (2.387)
Divorce rate 0.012 ** 0.008 * 0.009 **
(3.602) (2.528) (2.991)
Percentage of population expressing some religious affiliation 0.016  0.007  0.002
(1.539) (0.941) (0.269)
Constant 1.392 ** 1.074 ** -3.357 ** 1.525 ** 0.665  -1.456  0.570
(11.830) (4.071) (-5.040) (8.915) (0.746) (-1.655) (0.566)
R-squared 0.326 0.175 0.507 0.134 0.023 0.564 0.581
Adjusted R-squared 0.322 0.165 0.501 0.129 0.017 0.544 0.560
Change in R-squared relative to Model 6 -0.238 -0.388 -0.057 -0.430 -0.541 Baseline 0.017
Number of observations 163 163 163 163 163 163 150
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 22
Baltagi-Li test statistic 165.82 ** 193.06 ** 156.02 ** 179.27 ** 210.55 ** 112.63 ** 103.10 **
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
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i The lowest number of firms for a country in any one year was 14.   
ii The results of this paper are not affected by modest variations in these sampling decisions. 
iii We undertook analyses based on a range of samples built from a variety of cut-off values for the minimum number of 
companies used in the construction of country-year data on board directorships (0, 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25), reducing the 
sample size to as few as 134 country-years of data with no impact on the signs or significance levels of estimated 
coefficients. Furthermore, we included the number of companies used in the construction of country-year data as a control 
variable in our analyses without effect.  
iv At the request of an anonymous reviewer we explored first order interactions between our independent variables 
associated with education, government and economy, finding no improvement in overall model fit associated with 
inclusion of these interactions. Another anonymous reviewer asked us to explore the impact of the gender wage gap as an 
independent variable, and we found that it was not significant when added to Model 6.   
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For the attention of reviewer A 
  
We present the text of your comments below followed by our response in italics. We 
believe that the changes we have made in response to your comments have improved 
the paper, and we thank you for all of your feedback on our paper.  
 
This revision represents a great improvement.  The flow is much clearer and 
comprehensive.  The main issue now is length.  If the authors can reduce the length by 
10 pages or so, then it will make a good and concise contribution to our understanding 
of women on boards.  I have some suggestions on cutting down length. To reduce 
size, try to edit any repetitious parts - the introduction is good and may be edited 
down a bit but more cutting can be made on the theoretical background part and the 
references.   
 
First, your reference section is very long - try to eliminate older and more marginal 
papers and focus on those papers most salient to your study.   
 
Thank you, we have responded to this comment by removing some older references, 
as well as focusing the reference list on those that support the core of our argument. 
We have cut 24 references, and we think this has improved the paper.  
 
In the theoretical background section, try to focus on those aspects of the theory that 
is most relevant to your study and what you are trying to accomplish in your paper. 
 
Thank you for challenging us to tighten our conceptual framing. In responding to 
your comment we have been mindful of deleting those elements of the theory 
development that were superfluous to the argument we were making. For example, we 
have deleted instances of repetition making the case for examining the micro-level 
outcomes of macro-level phenomena. We feel this has resulted in a more concise 
exposition of the theoretical framing and thus improved the paper.  
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For the attention of reviewer B 
 
We present the text of your comments below followed by our response in italics. We 
believe that the changes we have made in response to your comments have improved 
the paper, and we thank you for all of your feedback on our paper.  
  
(1) Women on boards and firm performance. I agree with your comment (in your 
response to my last review) that overall, there is a commonly held assumption that 
women on boards improve firm performance. However, I continue to take issue with 
your statement about the extent to which peer-reviewed research finds this commonly 
held assumption to hold. In the revised version of the paper, almost two entire pages 
are spent discussing the issue, which is summarized with the sentence: “Despite the 
empirical evidence indicating that gender diverse boards are beneficial to firms…” 
The empirical evidence is, in fact, quite mixed, with many studies finding a negative 
relationship (e.g., Bøhren & Strøm, 2010; Darmadi, 2011; Minguez-Vera & Martin, 
2011) and several others finding a null relationship (e.g., Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, & 
Simpson, 2010; Rose, 2007; Shrader, Blackburn, & Iles, 1997). If I am interpreting 
your latest response to my review correctly, you see value in alluding to the women 
on board firm performance relationship, because “the findings that women board 
directors contribute to increased financial performance and governance practices are 
often highlighted as reasons why the issue board gender diversity is important and 
worthy of study”. However, the core issue in your paper - female board representation 
- is important regardless of whether it improves firm performance. In other words, 
even if adding women to boards did not affect firm performance, ensuring equal 
access is a worthy cause! If you still find it important to discuss this issue, I would 
suggest alluding to the commonly held assumption in the media that women improve 
firm performance, while acknowledging the truly conflicting evidence in academic 
research.  
 
Thank you for your comment. We now mention the normative case for female board 
membership as well as streamlined our presentation of the performance case. The 
discussion of the literature on the performance case is now a single paragraph 
instead of two pages in length, and it includes the statement, “The empirical results of 
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gender heterogeneous boards is mixed.” We have also added the following paragraph 
on page 6 to recognize the normative case for women on the board: 
 
A less commonly adopted, yet equally important, motivation for analyzing the 
imperative of women corporate board directors, is that qualified women board 
candidates have the same inherent right to accessing board seats as men 
(Grosvold, Brammer and Rayton, 2007). Until women and men have the same 
access to and opportunities for corporate board directorships, gender parity 
will not prevail, and firms will continue to miss out on the skills, insights and 
contributions women bring (Holton, 2000). Whilst women are now better 
represented across the labor force in general, some argue that the tendency 
towards only justifying commitment to gender equality in the board room on 
the premise of firm performance undermines the basic tenet of equality, which 
seeks to offer the same opportunities for women as men (Conroy, 2000).  
  
 
(2) The pipeline issue. The core institutions under study in your paper are primarily 
relevant to understanding the pipeline issue. In many places in your manuscript, you 
refer to women opting to serve on board (p. 11); women making choices (p. 38), etc. 
A different institutional analysis would consider the factors that lead firms to appoint 
women to their boards. What about the demand-side: do governance-related issues 
contribute to this (e.g., SOX; institutionalization of regulation, pending legislation, 
and legislation)? A discussion of the other side of the coin (the demand side) should 
be featured in the limitation section.  
 
You are right to point out that we have only looked at the supply side of the issue, and 
in response to your comment we now make it clear on page 4 that we are considering 
the supply side only, and we have added the absence of a focus on the demand side as 
a limitation on p. 34.  
 
(3) Countries in your sample. Given the increasingly global scope of the question of 
women on boards and the number of countries represented in the study of women on 
boards, how would you address the concerns some of your readers may have, about 
the very select group of countries in your sample (only 1 Asian country, no African 
countries; no South American countries)? Please add a paragraph or statement in the 
limitations section. (I realize that there are data collection issues, but can we assume 
that the same institutions will work similarly all over the world?)  
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This limitation is now explicitly recognized on page 34, as you requested. 
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For the attention of the Editor 
  
Reviewer A recommends that the manuscript be trimmed back by say 10 pages.  I 
concur that the present manuscript is unwieldy; and also wordy (see editor’s 
comments further below).  The reviewer recommends reducing the theoretical section 
and eliminating older, less important references.  I do not know that you can remove 
10 pages, but a tighter manuscript would be better for publication.  I do not set an 
absolute maximum requirement but reducing the manuscript back by 5 to 10 pages is 
desirable.  Manuscripts have a habit of length creep during revisions. 
 
Thank you for your guidance, we have successfully cut 7 pages from the manuscript.  
  
Reviewer B makes three recommendations concerning content.  I support these 
recommendations. 
 
(1) Assuming there is literatur  (as cited by reviewer) that leaves the empirical 
relationship between board composition and firm performance unresolved, I 
concur with reviewer that it would be better to (a) acknowledge the range of 
findings – briefly, (b) separate the firm performance issue explicitly from the 
equal access rights issue (which would hold even if firm performance suffered 
somewhat, and certainly if the effect were neutral).  Then you explain your 
findings and which possibility they support.  I think reviewer has a good point 
that a neutral exposition of the literature would be better. 
 
We have responded to reviewer B’s concerns and those you summarize above, and 
we have acknowledged the variety in the literature, whilst also highlighting the 
equal rights argument. We feel the result is a better and more balanced view. Please 
see the final paragraph beginning on p. 5 and the first paragraph beginning on p. 6 
(copied into the response to reviewer B) for the relevant text.  
 
(2) It is not feasible (I think) to tackle the demand side of the problem in this 
manuscript.  However, I concur with the reviewer that you should (a) differentiate 
supply and demand early in the manuscript, (b) add a paragraph in the limitations 
section on this point.  You may want to state in both locations that you address 
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demand through national level intervention (that is, the other factors are working only 
very slowly on demand, which was changed dramatically in Norway).  The point may 
be useful.   
 
Thank you for this suggestion. We now make it clear on page 4 that we are 
considering the supply side only, and we have added the absence of a focus on the 
demand side as a limitation on p. 34.  
 
(2) I concur with reviewer that the limitations inherent in the sample should be 
addressed through a sentence early where sample is described and then 
through a paragraph in limitations.  You should in the latter explain briefly 
data collection issues.  The findings are effectively restricted to the sample 
countries.  This point should be highlighted. 
 
This limitation is now explicitly noted at the bottom of page 18, and we return to this 
in the limitations listed on page 34, as requested. 
  
Plainly, B’s requirements (although limited) add content (and perhaps some 
references – I did not check the existing set), while A recommends trimming content 
and references.  Authors will need to work out the balancing of the manuscript, but it 
is too long and somewhat unwieldy.  A tighter manuscript will do better in publication 
(I think). 
 
We think the changes we have made in response to these comments has resulted in a 
shorter, tighter and more focused paper, while also responding fully to reviewer B’s 
requests for additional content. We hope you will agree.   
  
EDITOR’S REQUIREMENTS 
  
The editor also has requirements for finalization – but these requirements concern 
format and style for BAS.  In this regard, I attach a mark-up of the manuscript for 
assistance and guidance.  Note that I did not mark the manuscript all the way through, 
rather I highlighted what I think are key matters – which you must carry out now 
throughout the next revision as well as possible.  I think we can save time by prepping 
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the manuscript fully for Sage production.  The list below is not necessarily exhaustive 
and again I did not thoroughly mark the whole manuscript but mostly key instances as 
guidance. 
 
Thank you for this. We found it very helpful.  
  
I also attach a BAS citation – reference – writing guidance document for your 
assistance.  I have moved footnotes to endnotes (BAS structure), to be numbered 1 to 
4 (Sage production should handle the matter).  Thus be aware that in BAS notes are 
separated from text – thus notes should be for technical matters that do not readily fit 
into the text (or eliminate in some way).  Key issues are: 
(1) BAS promotes formal writing (the authors).  “Our” is generally OK, but “we” 
should be restricted and not appear in abstract, introduction, or last couple of 
pages.  “We” can then be artfully woven into the center of manuscript which is more 
about methodology.  This writing style (although popular at some journals) is in this 
instance combined with multiple instances of undefined this, split infinitives, lengthy 
sentences, and passive voice.  The purpose of formal writing is to tighten up loose 
expression.  Each “this” should be replaced or defined concretely. 
(2) The CONCLUSION section is useless, being one paragraph which is 
repetitive.  While journals promote a standardized structure for empirical papers 
(introduction, literature review, hypotheses exposition, methodology, findings, 
discussion, limitations, conclusion), in this instance the resulting manuscript is 
unwieldy and should be trimmed back.  A possible solution (I mark at the point) is to 
think in terms of a final DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND LIMITATIONS, with 
integration of the present last paragraph in some way.  You may want to end the 
DISCUSSION section with that paragraph so that the manuscript does not appear to 
end abruptly – but the standardized structure is in conflict with the length issue. 
(3) References need to be put systematically into BAS format (APA standards as used 
in BAS).  I marked some obvious instances.  The BAS guidance document provides 
some standards and examples. 
  
Look through the mark up.  You can save a copy and then in that copy “accept all 
changes” and remove all highlighted (to draw your attention at certain items).  Note 
that BAS uses commas in all strings (text and in-text cites of 3+ authors).  There is a 
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problem in how Brammer et al. 2007a is cited; see my suggestion which amounts to 
the first Brammer et al. (which is in the wrong order alphabetically I believe) should 
be a systematically and the second Brammer et al. should be b systematically; or 
perhaps Brammer, Millington ... should be cited as such throughout.  You should look 
at the problem; and then Sage copyediting (which comes next) may resolve what to 
do. 
  
The third revision (thus R3) can be uploaded to manuscript central when you are 
ready.  I will set manuscript central to conditional acceptance of the second revision 
(R2).  We are ready to proceed to finalization, but there is some significant writing 
work to address.  If you have a question on any particular point, email me for 
assistance. 
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